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Introduction
 Ring 0, -1, -2, (-3) root kits
– Run on platform
 Malicious peripherals?
– Keyboard, firewire devices, hard disks
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Compromising Keyboards
 K. Chen owns Apple keyboard @BH2009 [1]
 Focus on hack
 Problem of data retrieval
– Need for physical access undesirable
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Jitterbug
 “Keyboards and Covert Channels” by Blaze et al. [2]
 Add delays between keystrokes to encode information 
over interactive connections like ssh
 Extra hardware between keyboard and PS/2 port
– Stores interesting keys like passwords
– Exports one bit at a time with each new keystroke
 Bit is encoded by time between keystrokes δi
– δi mod w = 0     → bit=0
– δi mod w = w/2 → bit=1
 [2] http://www.usenix.org/events/sec06/tech/shah.html
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Motivation
 Needed a project for students :)
 Combination of both papers feasible?
 Go one step further
– Real-time keylogger
– Encode each keystroke in timing delay
– Eavesdrop on chat conversations, etc.
• No physical access needed
• Not detectable
• Persistent root kit
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Current status
 Flashing works, own tool for linux
 Key logging works
 Open problems
– Jitterbug data export highly error prone
– Many error sources → timers, etc.
– Driver polls keyboard in fixed (big) intervals
• Missing synchronization
• Too slow for data rates > 1bit/keystroke
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Thank you!
Questions?
